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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia-genocide and crimes against humanity-
international criminal law and procedure-plea bargaining-justice, reconciliation, and sentencing 
PROSECUTOR V. PlAVSIC. Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S. Sentencing Judgment. At <http:// 
www.un.org/icty /ind-e.htm>. 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, February 27, 2003. 
Prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have 
recently been obtaining an increased number of guilty pleas. In the last two-and-a-half years, 
twelve IC1Y defendants have pleaded guilty, with eight of those pleas occuning in just the last 
nine months.' Most of these guilty pleas garnered little attention because most of the defen-
dants making the guilty pleas had engaged in relatively minor crimes, at least by the standards 
of a war crimes tribunal. Milan Simic, for instance, pleaded guilty to torture as a crime against 
humanity for organizing and participating in the beating of five men.2 Dragan Kolundzija was 
a shift leader at the notorious Keraterm Detention Center but was not convicted of personally 
mistreating any detainees or of having any meaningful control over the conditions in the 
1 The December 2000 guilty plea ofStevan Todorovic, Prosecutorv. Todorovic, Case No.1T-95-9/ 1-S, Senteuc-
ingjudgment, para. 4 (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Todorovic sentencingjudgment], was followed in September 
200 I by three guilty pleas in the Sikiricacase, Prosecutorv. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-S, SemencingJudgmem (Nov. 
13,2001) [hereinafter Sikirica sentencingjudgment]. Five months later, in Februaty 2002, Milan Simic pleaded guilty, 
Prosecutor v. tvlilan Simic, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencingjudgment, paras. 9-10 (Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter 
Simic sentencingjudgment]. Biljana Plavsic, the defendant in the instant case, pleaded guilty eight months after 
that, in October 2002, Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT -00-39&40/ 1-S, Sentencing judgment, para. 5 (Feb. 27, 
2003) [hereinafter Plavsic sentencingjudgment]. The pace has quickened in recent months with Momir Nikolic 
and Dragan Obrenovic pleading guilty in May 2003, 1CTY Press ReleaseJL/P.l.S./751-e (May, 7, 2003) (Nikolic), 
ICTY Press ReleaseJL/P.I.S./756-E (May, 21, 2003) (Obrenovic), and these pleas were quickly followed by Predrag 
Banovic's guilty plea in june 2003, ICTY Press ReleaseJL/P.l.S./764-e (June 26, 2003), by Darko Mrdja's guilty 
plea in July 2003, Marlise Simons, In a Startling Plea, a Serbian Policeman Confesses to Atrocities, N.Y. TIM~:~.July 27, 2003, 
§1, at 9, by Miodragjokic's guilty plea in August 2003, 1CTYPress Release CVO/P.I.S./776-e (Aug. 27, 2003), and 
by Dragan NikoliC's guilty plea in September2003, lCTYPress Release CVO/P.l.S./778-e (Sept. 4, 2003). The basic 
legal documents, cases (judgments, orders, transcripts, and so on), press releases, and other materials relating 
to the ICTY are available on its Web site, <http:/ /www.un.org/icty/>. 
Two ICTY defendants pleaded guilty prior to Todoravic, though in neither case did prosecutors bar~rain with the 
defendants in order to induce their pleas. Drazen Erdemovic, a foot soldier in the Serbian army who participated 
in the Srebrenica massacres, brought himself and his crimes to the attention of the ICTY in 1996 and, once an 
indictment was prepared, immediately told prosecutors everything he knew and pleaded guilty to crimes against 
humanity. Prosecutorv. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencingjudgment, paras. 3, 6,10 (Nov. 29, 1996). 
Go ran Jelisic otfered the next guilty plea (over the objections of his lawyers), and he received no concessions therefor. 
Prosecutor v.Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T,Judgment, paras. 12[a], 15-16 (Dec. 14, 1999). For a more detailed dis-
cussion ofErdemovicand jelisic, see Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargainingojfntema-
tional Crimes, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. I, 109-17 (2002). 
At the ICTY's sister tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, three defendants have pleaded 
guilty: Jean Kambanda, Omar Semshago, and Georges Ruggiu. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 
Judgment and Sentence, para. 3 (Sept. 4, 1998); Prosecutorv. Serushago, Case No.1CTR-98-39-S, Sentence, paras. 
2-4 (Feb. 5, 1999); Prosecutorv. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-l,Judgmentand Sentence, paras. 7, 44 (June 1, 2000). 
The basic legal documents, cases (judgments, orders, transcripts, and so on), and other materials relating to the 
ICTR are available on its Web site, <http:/ /www.ictr.org>. 
2 Simic sentencingjudgment, supm note I, paras. 10-11. 
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camp. 3 When Biljana Plavsic-the defendant in the instant case4-pleaded guilty in October 
2002, however, the plea made headlines worldwide.5 From 1990 through 1992, Plavsic was the 
Serbian representative to the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
serving for a time as the acting co-president of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and later as a member of the collective and expanded Presidencies of the Republika Srpska.6 
Known as the "Serbian Iron Lady" as a result of her hard-line nationalism and rabidly anti-
Muslim views, Plavsic was a close ally of Radovan Karadzic. 7 
Plavsic was the first Bosnian Serb leader to plead guilty. In doing so, she acknowledged that 
the Bosnian Serb leadership had conducted a campaign of ethnic cleansing. Committed to 
ensuring that all Serbs in the former Yugoslavia would remain in a common state, the Bosnian 
Serb forces, with the assistance ofYugoslavia's army and Serbian paramilitary units, imple-
mented the "objective of ethnic separation by force"8 by killing and forcibly expelling rion-
Serb civilians, destroying property and religious buildings, and operating detention centers 
where prisoners were beaten, raped, and confined in appalling conditions without adequate 
food, water, or sanitary conditions.9 As the trial chamber's sentencing judgment10 vividly 
recounts, the campaign resulted in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands ofBosnian Mus-
lims and Croats. Approximately 850 Muslim- and Croat-occupied villages were destroyed en-
tirely, 11 and in many municipalities virtually all non-Serbs were killed or forced to flee. In the 
37 municipalities described in PlavsiC's indictment, the evidence showed that Serbian forces 
killed approximately fifty thousand non-Serbs, 12 destroyed more than one hundred mosques 
and Catholic churches, 13 and established more than four hundred detention facilities, which 
confined nearly one hundred thousand people. 14 
Plavsic was by no means the most culpable of those leading the Bosnian Serbs during the 
ethnic cleansing. The "factual basis" to which Plavsic agreed states that Radovan Karadzic 
and MomCilo Krajisnik exercised primary control over the Bosnian Serb power structures, and 
it was they who instructed municipal leaders charged with implementing the persecutory 
campaign. 15 Plavsic played a lesser role, but she did support the ethnic cleansing by serving as 
a co-president and by inviting Serbian paramilitaries to assist in the ethnic cleansing. She also 
publicly encouraged the forcible expulsions, in particular by telling Bosnian Serbs that they 
3 Sikirica sentencing judgment, supra note 1, para. 33. 
4 See supra note l. 
5 See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Ex-Bosnia Serb Leader Enters Guilty Plea in The Hague, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2002, at A6; 
Isabelle Wesselingh, Ji'ormer Bosnian Serb President Admits Crimes Against Humanity, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 2, 
2002; Katarina Kratovac, Bosnian Serb L£ader Pleads Guilty to Crimes Against Humanity at Yugoslav Tribunal, AssoCIATED 
PRESS, Oct. 2, 2002. 
6 Plavsic sentencing judgment, sujJra note 1, para. 10. 
7 Bosnia's Iron Lady jailed, BBC ONLINE NEWS REPORT, Feb. 27, 2003; Serb War Criminal Smtenced to 11 Years in 
Prison, AssOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 27, 2003 (describing Plavsic as the "right hand" ofRadovan Karadzic); Isabel Vincent, 
Bosnia's 'Iron Lady' Owns Up to Atrocities, Implicates Milosevic, NATIONAL POST, Dec. 17, 2002; Katarina Kratovac, 
Bosnian Serb Lender Pleads Guilty to Crimes Against Humanity at Yugoslav Tribunal, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 2, 2002. 
Plavsic once described Muslims as "a genetic defect on the Serbian body." Alissa]. Rubin, Former Serb Leader's Admis-
sion of Guilt Alienates Compatriots, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at A4. A notorious photograph taken during the first 
days of the conflict showed Plavsic stepping over the body of a dead Muslim civilian to kiss the murderous Serbian 
warlord Zeljko Raznjatovic, better known as Arkan, greeting him as a patriot. Bill Glauber, Sentent:e Hearings Start 
for Iron Lady of Balkans, CHI. TR!B., Dec. 17, 2002, at 3. 
8 Plavsic sentencingjudgment, supra note 1, para. 15. 
9 Id., paras. 30-48. 
10 See supra note I. 
11 Plavsic sentencing judgment, supra note 1, para. 32. 
1 ~ Jd., para. 41. 
'"Id., para. 44. 
14 Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/ 1-S, Transcript, at 416 (Dec. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Dec. 16 tran-
script]; Plavsic sentencingjudgment, sujJra note 1, paras. 45-48 (describing the conditions). 
15 Prosecution v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No.IT-00-39&40-PT, Factual Basis for Plea of Guilt, para. 16 (Sept. 30, 
2002) [hereinafter Plavsic factual basis] (on file with author). 
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were in danger of genocide at the hands of Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and that certain 
territories were "Serbian by right." 16 
For these actions, the prosecution indicted Plavsic on two counts of genocide and complicity 
in genocide and six counts of crimes against humanity. 17 Plavsic voluntarily surrendered to the 
IC1Y, and in October 2002, before the trial commenced, she pleaded guilty to one count of 
persecution as a crime against humanity. 18 The prosecution dropped the remaining seven 
charges, including the genocide charges. 19 
The impact of Plavsic 's guilty plea and her expressions of remorse on peace-building efforts 
in Bosnia became a central focus ofPlavsiC's subsequent sentencing hearing. The prosecution 
and defense joined in remarkable agreement as to the benefits ofPlavsiC's actions. The pros-
ecution, for instance, not only lauded the guilty plea as "an unprecedented contribution to 
the establishment of truth and a significant effort toward the advancement of reconciliation,"20 
but elicited testimony from virtually all of its witnesses about the reconciliatory effects ofPlavSic's 
plea. 21 The prosecution further asserted that it and the defense 
share the view that it is only through the establishment of truth about what occurred in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that the fragile and vital process of reconciliation can begin. Fur-
thermore, we agree that it is only through the establishment of truth that the unhealthy 
shackles of revision that debilitate the former Yugoslavia and that foster suspicion, ethnic 
hatred, and civil unrest can be broken.22 
As a result of their shared perspective, the prosecution and defense took the unprecedented 
step of jointly presenting two witnesses: Madeleine Albright, U.S. secretary of state during the 
Clinton administration, and Alex Boraine, deputy chairperson of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Both witnesses, like the prosecution, praised PlavsiC's guilty plea 
for the contribution that it would make to reconciliation in Bosnia.23 
Plavsic sounded the same themes in making her own statement at the sentencing hearing. 
She stated, in part: 
I have now come to the belief and accept the fact that many thousands of innocent peo-
ple were the victims of an organised, systematic effort to remove Muslims and Croats from 
the territory claimed by Serbs .... Our leadership, of which I was a necessary part, led 
an effort which victimised countless innocent people .... 
16 Plav5ic fuctual basis, supra note 15, at para. 17; Plav5ic sentencingjudgment, supra note 1, paras. 14, 17. Plav5ic once 
said that if Serbs lost half their population in the batde for a Greater Serbia, it would be worth it Rubin, supra note 7. 
17 Prosecutorv. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT -00-39&40-PT, Amended Consolidated Indictment (Mar. 7, 2002). 
The six counts of crimes against humanity consisted of one count of persecution, three counts of extermination and 
killing, and two counts of deportation and inhumane acts, all as crimes against humanity. !d. 
18 Plavsic sentencingjudgment, supra note 1, paras. 1, 5. 
19 Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Decision Granting Prosecution's Motion to Dismiss Counts 
I, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Amended Consolidated Indictment (Dec. 20, 2002). 
20 Prosecution v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Prosecution's Brief on the Sentencing of Biljana Plavsic, 
para. 24 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Prosecution's sentencing brief] (on file with author). 
21 See Dec. 16 transcript, supra note 14, at408 (In response to a question seeking the witness's "view of the poten-
tial contribution toward reconciliation of Mrs. PlavsiC'sacknowledgementofthe crimes and acceptance of respon-
sibility," Mirsad Tokacadescribed it as "an extremely courageous, brave, and important gesture [that] represents sup-
port to what is the ultimate aim of all of us[, namely, that] normal conditions oflife should be resumed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but in the entire region as well."), 450-53 (Teufika Ibrahimefendic 
responding to the prosecution's query as to "how the ability to talk about the events of the war could contribute 
to a greater understanding and tolerance and possibly reconciliation within Bosnia"), 458-59 (Elie Wiesel praising 
Plavsic as "the only accused to have freely and wholly assumed her role in the wrongdoings and crimes set out in 
the indictment, even though she once moved in the highest circles of power in her country"). 
22 I d. at 376. 
23 See Prosecutorv. Plav5ic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Transcript, at520-22, 562-66 (Dec. 17, 2002) [hereinafter 
Dec. 17 transcript]. 
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You have heard, both yesterday and today, the litany of suffering that this produced. 
I have accepted responsibility for my part in this. This responsibility is mine and mine 
alone. It does not extend to other leaders who have a right to defend themselves. It cer-
tainly should not extend to our Serbian people, who have already paid a terrible price for 
our leadership. The knowledge that I am responsible for such human suffering and for 
soiling the character of my people will always be with me. 
There is a justice which demands a life for each innocent life, a death for each wrong-
ful death. It is, of course, not possible for me to meet the demands of such justice. I can 
only do what is in my power and hope that it will be of some benefit, that having come to 
the truth, to speak it, and to accept responsibility. This will, I hope, help the Muslim, Croat, 
and even Serb innocent victims not to be overtaken with bitterness, which often becomes 
hatred and is in the end self-destructive.24 
The prosecution and defense also agreed that, following the war, Plavsic took great steps 
to advance peace and reestablish the rule of law in Bosnia. Both parties elicited testimony 
showing that Plavsic broke her ties with Karadzic and was instrumental in the implementation 
of the Dayton Agreement.25 She fired General Ratko Mladic26 and made efforts to eliminate 
corruption in Republika Srpska,27 going so far as to dissolve the National Assembly, which 
was dominated by hard-liners.28 She took these actions, the witnesses agreed, in the face of 
great political and personal risks. 29 
Despite their substantial areas of agreement, the prosecution and defense did not agree on 
the sentence that Plavsic should receive. The prosecution recommended a sentence of between 
fifteen and twenty-five years' imprisonment.30 The defense introduced evidence oflife expectan-
cies and argued that, because Plavsic was seventy-two years old, any sentence of imprisonment 
longer than eight years would effectively be a life sentence, the imposition of which would vio-
late the prohibition against cruel and unusual, or inhumane or degrading, punishment. 31 
The trial chamber sentenced Plavsic to eleven years' imprisonment.32 The chamber iden-
tified one aggravating factor (Plavsic's superior position) and four mitigating factors (her 
voluntary surrender, age, postconflict conduct, and guilty plea) .33 As for Plavsic's age, 'the 
chamber, after surveying municipal court decisions and decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, rejected the view that a sentence in excess of eight years would constitute 
inhumane or degrading punishment, but it did conclude that the advanced age of a defen-
dant was relevant to determining the appropriate sentence. First, physical deterioration asso-
ciated with advanced age may make the same sentence harder to serve for an older defendant 
than for a younger one, and second, an older defendant may have little worthwhile life left 
upon release. 34 The chamber made clear, however, that while advanced age and voluntary sur-
render gained Plavsic some benefit, her guilty plea and postconflict conduct were given greater 
weight. "Together, these circumstances make a fom1idable body of mitigation."3'' 
2
' /d. at 609-11. 
25 Plavsic sentencing judgment, supra note 1, para. 86. 
26 Dec. 17 transcript, sufJra note 23, at 559. 
27 /d. at 578-79. 
2
" /d. at 579-80; Plavsic sentencing judgment, sufmt note I, para. 86. 
2'J The wiu1esses described the efforts of hard-liners "in Pale to get rid of (Piavsic], because they judged that Dayton-
full Dayton implementation was a threat to them." Dec. 17 transcript, supra note 23, at 554-55. 
30 Prosecution's sentencing brief, supra note 20, para. 43; Prosecutorv. Plavsic, Case No.IT-00-39&40/1-S, Tran-
script, at 638 (Dec. 18, 2002). 
31 Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/ 1-S, Biljana Plavsic's Sentencing Brief, paras. 50-53, 59 (Nov. 25, 
2002); Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/ 1-S, Transcript, at 651 (Dec. 18, 2002). 
32 Plavsic sentencing judgment, sujJra note I, para. 132; see also Serb Wm Criminal Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison, 
AsSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 27, 2003 (reporting that Plavsic smiled slightly when she heard the prison term). 
33 Plavsic sentencingjudgment, sujna note I, paras. 57, 110. 
" /d., paras. I 04-05. 
35 /d., para. 110. 
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The trial chamber held thatPlavsic's expressions of remorse, "together with the substantial 
saving of international time and resources as a result of a plea of guilty before trial," entitled 
Plavsic to a "discount in the sentence which would otherwise have been appropriate."36 The 
trial chamber went on separately to consider, as a "further and significant circumstance," 
the role ofPlavsic's guilty plea "in establishing the truth in relation to the crimes and further-
ing reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. "37 Plavsic herself asserted that acknowledging the 
crimes committed during the war was a necessary step toward peace and reconciliation-a 
view that the trial chamber wholeheartedly endorsed. 38 Consequently, the chamber gave 
"significant weight" to Plavsic's guilty plea in conjunction with her "expressed remorse and 
positive impact on the reconciliatory process."39 
As previously noted, the trial chamber also gave "significant weight" to PlavsiC's postcon-
flict conduct. Reviewing the testimony from the sentencing hearing, the chamber concluded 
that Plavsic was instrumental in ensuring that the Dayton Agreement was accepted and imple-
mented in Republika Srpska. Moreover, in so doing, she made a significant contribution to 
peace in the region. Noting the "high international reputation" of the witnesses who testified 
on behalf of Plavsic, the chamber stated that the support of witnesses of such stature "adds 
much weight to the plea in mitigation."40 
* * * * 
Does the truth telling that arises from a guilty plea foster reconciliation and peace building 
in war-torn lands? Proponents of truth commissions certainly believe that the information 
generated through those bodies can assist victims in their psychological healing and eventual 
reintegration into society.41 Similarly, human rights activists emphasize the benefits of truth 
telling in the wake of governmental transitions from repressive to democratic regimes. Aware 
of the political and financial constraints that typically render widespread prosecutions a prac-
tical impossibility, activists often seek, instead, to place a burden on successor governments to 
establish some sort of truth-seeking mechanisms. These mechanisms help to distinguish the 
new government from its repressive predecessor42 and provide information that the new gov-
ernment may need to prevent a recurrence of the conditions that gave rise to the crimes.43 
The IC1Y advances similar arguments in praise of Plavsic's guilty plea, but it is not clear, 
at least at this point, whether the guilty plea can live up to those claims. Admittedly, PlavsiC did 
acknowledge her criines, but she did so in a five-page document that presented only a brief 
sketch of the atrocities that were committed and ofPlavsiC's role in implementing them. PlavSic 
36 !d., para. 73. 
37 !d. 
38 !d., para. 74. Specifically, Plav5ic stated: "To achieve any reconciliation or lasting peace in [Bosnia-Herzegovina], 
serious violations of humanitarian law during the war must be acknowledged by those who bear responsibility-
regardless of their ethnic group. This acknowledgement is an essential first step." !d. The trial chamber cited Alex 
Boraine's testimony that "full disclosure in confessions is vital for the reconciliatory process" and that "genuine 
and voluntary expressions of remorse often provide a degree of closure for victims." !d., para. 77. The trial chamber 
also cited Mirsad Tokaca's similar testimony, id., para. 78, and concluded that Plavsic's guilty plea "and her acknowl-
edgement of responsibility, particularly in light of her former position as President ofRepublika Srpska, should pro-
mote reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region as a whole," id., para. 80. 
39 !d., para. 81. 
40 !d., para. 94. 
41 See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MAsS VIo-
LENCE 61 ( 1998); PRISCILlA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
30-31 (2002). Hayner reports, however, that victims who relive the brutal details of their experiences before truth 
commissions without being provided subsequent psychological support are in danger of experiencing sy11J.ptoms 
of post-traumatic stress disorder. !d. at 141-44. 
42 RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 89-90 (2000). 
43 See, e.g.,Jose Zalaquett, Confrrmting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Gaucrnments: Principles Applicable 
and Political Constraints, in 1 TRANSITIONAL jUSTICE: HOW EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 3, 
6, 7 (Neil]. Kritz ed., 1995). 
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also expressed remorse, and it must be acknowledged that she did so with a seemingly greater 
degree of sincerity than previous IC1Y defendants who pleaded guilty were able to muster. 44 
But even PlavsiC's remorseful expressions go only so far. Although Plavsic was clear in taking 
responsibility for her own actions, she was equally clear in limiting that responsibility, stating 
that it was hers and hers "alone" and that it did "not extend to other leaders who have a right 
to defend themselves. "45 In the same vein, Plavsic categorically refused to cooperate with the 
prosecution by providing information or testifying in other cases. 46 Under ordinary circum-
stances, such a refusal might lead one to doubt a defendant's commitment to truth telling.47 
In PlavsiC's case, however, the prosecution did not even mention her refusal in its sentencing 
brief, necessitating that the trial chamber inquire as to the prosecution's views.48 Such reticence 
has by no means characterized the prosecution's submissions in other cases. In both jelisic and 
SimiC, for instance, the prosecution was quite keen to inform the trial chambers of the defen-
dants' refusals to cooperate.49 
So why all the kindness and solicitude for Plavsic? fn some part, it represents merely the 
next step in the ICTYs increasing acceptance of, and desire for, guilty pleas-a trend that can 
be traced through the cases preceding PlavsiC. In its early days, the IC1Y did not even have pro-
cedures regarding the making and accepting of guilty pleas, 5° and the idea that guilty pleas 
would be compensated by sentencing concessions was a controversial one at best.'>! Over the 
years, the idea gained ground, and by the time that Stevan Todorovic pleaded guilty in Decem-
ber 2000, he was able to secure a prosecutorial promise to recommend a sentence of no longer 
than twelve years' imprisonment in exchange for his plea and a pledge to cooperate,52 even 
though the prosecution believed he would have received a fifteen-to-twenty-five-year sen-
tence had he been convicted at trial. 53 Nine months later, the three Sikiricadefendants were 
able to negotiate a similar deal even though they did not plead guilty until the vast bulk of the 
trial had already been completed, and they did not agree to cooperate. 54 Following the pros-
ecution's lead in these more recent cases, the trial chambers have emphasized the benefits of 
guilty pleas, promised concessions to defendants who make them, 55 and, most importantly, 
imposed sentences in accordance with the prosecution's recommendations, thereby maintain-
ing the prosecution's credibility for the next bargain. 
No one can say, then, that the PlavsiCjudgment comes as a complete surprise, but the almost 
reflexive enthusiasm about Plavsic's guilty plea, exhibited particularly by the prosecution, is un-
precedented. Presumably, it springs from factors relating both to Plavsic's position in the eyes 
of Bosnians and to the ICTYs position in the eyes of the VN Security Council. Turning to the 
44 See Combs, supra note 1, at 151-52 (describing previous, unsatisfactory statements of remorse). 
45 Dec. 17 transcript, supra note 23, at 610. 
46 Press StatementofBi!jana Plavsic (Oct. 2, 2002), at <http:/ /www.un.org/icty/pressreal/plav_statement.htm>. 
47 Plavsic could, of course, have feared reprisals had she agreed to cooperate with the prosecution, but her assis-
tance would have been so valuable that the prosecution undoubtedly would have undertaken unprecedented efforts 
to protect her safety. In addition, it is unlikely that Plavsic's refusal was motivated by fear since she was willing to 
place herself in extreme danger a few years earlier when seeking to implement the Dayton Agreement and to root 
out cormption in Republika Srpska. 
48 Dec. 16 transcript, supra note 14, at 378. 
49 SeeProsecutorv. Milan Simic, Case No. IT-95-9/2-T, Prosecutor's Brief on the SentencingofMilan Simic, para. 
50 (July 15, 2002) (on file with author); Prosecutorv.Jelisic, Case No.IT-95-1 0-T, Transcript, at 3,077 (Nov. 24, 1997). 
''
0 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Sep. and Diss. Op., Cassese,J., para. 10 (Oct. 7, 1997); see 
also IClYRULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 62 ter (as amended Dec. 12, 2002) (governing guilty pleas; adopted 
in December 2001). 
51 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN jUSTICE 67 (1997). 
52 Todorovic sentencingjudgment, supra note 1, para. 11. 
''"Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Transcript, at 55 (May 4, 2001). 
54 Sikirica sentencing judgment, supra note I, paras. 25, 31, 37 (describing plea agreements). 
5
'' See, e.g., Todorovic sentencingjudgment, supra note I, para. 80 (July 31, 200 I) (stating tl1ata guilty plea "should, 
in principle, give rise to a reduction in the sentence that the accused would otherwise have received"); Sikirica 
sentencingjudgment, supra note I, paras. 149-50. 
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second point first, the ICTY dispenses slow and expensive justice. Prior to the recent spate 
of guilty pleas, the Tribunal has taken ten years and nearly $650 million to resolve eighteen 
cases,56 and it has been widely criticized for the slow pace and high cost of its proceedings. 57 
Good reasons exist for the long time and substantial funds expended, 58 but the Security 
Council does notcurrentlyfind those reasons to be persuasive. With the United States leading 
the charge, the Security Council has lately pressured the ICTY to adopt a timetable for com-
pleting its work, prompting the Tribunal propose that it will finish its trials by 2008.59 A guilty 
plea in even the most straightforward case, then, is tremendously valuable in time and resource 
savings, and the savings accruing in cases involving high-level defendants are all the more dra-
matic. Since high-level defendants typically performed no dirty deeds themselves, tracing the 
crimes to their orders can be an especially complicated, time-consuming task. In the court of 
public opinion, Slobodan Milosevic, for instance, is without question responsible for the eth-
nic cleansing campaign in Bosnia and the forced expulsions in Kosovo. But in the court oflaw 
called the ICTY, the prosecutors have had painstakingly to trace-sometimes through fickle 
insiderwitnesses60-the line from the mass graves to the man ordering the actions that filled 
them. High-level defendants who admit their guilt and thereby obviate the need for such 
proof taking are valuable commodities indeed, and the ICTYhas a strong interest in treating 
them in a way that encourages other defendants to behave likewise. 
Admissions of guilt from high-level defendants confer on the ICTY not only practical ben-
efits, but reputational ones. At its inception, the Tribunal was accused of bias and illegitimacy, 
with some of those charges made even by supporters of international prosecutions. 61 The ICTY 
has withstood these challenges so that Milosevic's initial tirades62 and Vojislav Sdelj's more 
recent defiance63 now seem, at least to most of the world, like the last, sad gasps of former strong-
men, rather than serious threats. That same view has not necessarily penetrated in the countries 
of the former Yugoslavia, however. MiloseviC's charges of an international plot against the Serbs 
56 The eighteen cases featured thirty-five defendant~. Budget figures and other statistics are available at the ICIY's 
Web site, <http:/ /www.un.org/icty>. 
57 See, e.g.,john E. Ackerman, Assignment of Defense Counsel at the ICTY_ in ESSAYS ON IC1Y PROCEDURE AND EVI-
DENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 167, 170 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001) ("One of the major 
criticisms levelled at the Tribunal is the length of trials."); Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the Operation and Functioning 
of the International Criminal Tribunals, 94 AJIL 759, 759 (2000) (describing the justified criticism of the Tribunals' 
"inordinately long trials"). 
58 See Nancy Amoury Combs, Establishing the International Criminal Court, 5 INT'L L. F. 77, 81 (2003) (citing, 
among other things, lack of state cooperation, complexity of crimes, and logistical difficulties). 
59 SeeSC Res. 1503 (Aug. 29, 2003); The U.N. Criminal TribunaL~ for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International justice 
or Show of justice? Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, 1 07th 
Con g. 20 (2002) (testimony of Pierre-Richard Prosper, ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, U.S. Department 
of State) ("We have and are urging both Tribunals to begin to aggressively focus on the end-game and conclude 
their work by2007-2008"); IC1YPress ReleaseJDH/P.I.S./690-e (july 26, 2002) (address by judge Claudejorda, 
IC1Y president, to the UN Security Council); see also Carla Del Ponte, Hiding in Plain Sight, N.Y. TIMES,June 28, 
2003, at A15. 
60 See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript, at 16,727 (Feb. 21, 2003) (prosecutor attempting 
to cross-examine his own witness, Dragan Vasilkovic, after Vasilkovic, under Milosevic's cross-examination, changed 
his story and disavowed a written statement). 
61 Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the JCTY in the Development of International Crimina/Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT'L 
LJ. 440, 444-45 ( 1999) (noting that "Brazil and China expressed concern that the interpretation of Security Council 
powers had been overstretched" and that "Mexico presented an official report, challenging the Security Council's 
authority to act as it did"). 
62 Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37-1, Transcript, at 2 (july 3, 2001) (Milosevic stating that "I consider 
this Tribunal a false Tribunal and the indictment a false indictment"). The Trial Chamber eventually turned off 
MiloseviC's microphone when he continued in the same fashion. See id. at5; see also Milosevic Again Defies Tribunal, 
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 30, 2001, at 7 ("After four months in prison, former President Slobodan Milosevic 
remained combative Monday, denouncing new war crimes charges by UN prosecutors and scorning three lawyers 
assigned to his defense."). 
63 SeeSerbRadicalDenies War Crimes, BBC NEWS, Mar. 25, 2003, at <http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/ 1/hi/world/europe/ 
288395l.stm> (describing Se5elj's refusal to enter a plea, refusal to stand when the judges entered the courtroom, 
and promise to use court appearances to make political speeches). 
936 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 97 
play well at home,64 and many Serbs continue to view the ICIY as an illegitimate institution con-
ducting a persecutorywitch-hunt.65 An admission of guilt proffered by a defendant with such 
sterling nationalist credentials as the Serbian Iron Lady not only provides strong evidence 
to counteract the self-serving histories that still hold sway among Serbs, but also serves to 
legitimate the institution that brought the criminal charges in the first place. 
To return to my initial question: does the truth-telling that arises from a guilty plea foster 
reconciliation and peace building in war-torn lands? Probably, it can. In some cases. But it may 
take a long, long time. Certainly news of Plavsic's guilty plea did not send Serbs rushing to 
examine their own consciences. Rather, a majority in the Republika Srpska denounced the 
plea as an act of treachery and betrayal. 66 Plavilic' s victims, for their part, were reportedly gratified 
by Plavsic's plea,67 but they decried the withdrawal of the genocide charges68 and condemned 
in harsher tones still the lenient, eleven-year sentence. 69 Truth telling is one thing; deal cut-
ting is another; and the latter appears to have few reconciliatory effects. Recognizing this fact, 
the Plavsicprosecution sought to minimize the appearance of compensation; indeed, the pros-
ecutor, Carla Del Ponte, went so far as to tell the trial chamber that Plavsic had not sought "to 
gain personal advantage" as a result of her guilty plea,'0 apparently not considering the with-
drawal of the genocide charges a personal advantage. Prospects for reconciliation were dealt 
a further blow when Plavsic was sent to serve her term in a posh Swedish prison that reportedly 
provides prisoners with use of a sauna, solarium, massage room, and horse-riding paddock, 
among other amenities. Victims reacted with predictable outrage. 71 
Plavsic presented the IC1Y with a difficult case in that it featured a defendant who was old 
enough that she would probably die before serving any sentence that the trial chamber might 
see fit to impose. The Trial Chamber might therefore have opted for symbolism; that is, it could 
have tried to satisfy victims by sentencing her to, say, twenty-five years' imprisonment, knowing 
that, in all likelihood, she would not have spent many more, if any more, years in prison than 
she would have under the eleven-year sentence. ButPlavsiC's co-indictee, Momcilo Krajisnik, 
for instance, is only fifty-eight years old, so for him, the difference between an eleven-year and 
a twenty-five-year sentence has real consequences. If the IC1Y wants to preserve any hope of 
obtaining a guilty plea from Krajisnik or other leaders like him, it will probably have to entice 
them with the implicit promise that they will see life after imprisonment. The IC1Y made that 
promise with Plavsic. 
Whether that promise is in the long-term interest of international criminal justice remains 
to be seen. On the fundamental question, the prosecution and trial chamber have it right. 
64 See Milosevic Supporters Demand His &lease from U.N. Court, AsSOCIATED PRESS,June 28, 2003; Rod Nordland 
& Zoran Ciijakovic, Back to the Future: Farewell, Yugoslavia. Hello to New Nationalist Politics, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 2003, at 39. 
65 See Serbian Town Wake5 Up to Graffiti Glnrifying Former President MiwseviC, BBC MONITORING INTERNATIONAL REPoRTS, 
June 27, 2003. 
66 Rubin, supra note 1; Daniela Valenta, PlavsicDenouncedasa Traitor, [INSTITUTEFORWAR&PEACEREPORTING] 
TRIBUNAL UPDATE, No. 293, Dec. 9-14,2002, at<http:/ /www.iwpr.net>. 
67 Daria Sito-Sucic, Muslim Victims Outraged, Say Plavsic Sentence Low, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 2003; Amra Kebo, &gional 
Report: Plavsic Sentence Divides Bosnia, [INSTITUTE FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING] TRIBUNAL UPDATE, No. 302, Feb. 
24-28, 2003 (reporting the views of Sulejman Tihic, Bosniak member of the Bosnian Presidency and a detainee 
in Serb detention centers, who described PlavsiC's plea as "'a highly moral act'" which helps establish the truth about 
the kind of war that took place"). 
68 Kebo, supra note 67; Peter Shard, Ex-Bosnian Serb Leader Admits Guilt, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, Oct. 2, 2002, at 
<http:/ /iafrica.com/news/worldnews/169826.htm>. 
69 Mujesir<t Memisevic, whose husband and children were killed during a Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing campaign, 
desCiibed the sentence as "outrageously low" and stated, "I am speechless. I cannot talk at all. I am shivering. I am com-
pletely shaken." Sito-Sucic, supra note 67. The president of Bosnia-Herzegovina's federal committee for the missing, 
Am or Masovic, observed that Plavsic "will spend just two and a half minutes in prison for every one of her 200,000 
Bosniak and Croat victims." Kebo, supra note 67. Serbian politicians, by contrast, denounced the sentence as too 
harsh. SeeSito-Sucic, supra note 67. 
70 Dec. 16 transcript, sujJra note 14, at 371. 
71 Patrick McLoughlin, Serb War Criminal P/avsic Goes to Swedish jail, REun:RS,June 27, 2003. 
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Peace is better advanced by defendants who acknowledge their atrocities rather than denying 
the obvious, who accept responsibility rather than blaming their enemies, and who apologize 
to victims rather than continuing their demonization. Even now, many Bosnian Serbs continue 
to deny, for instance, that massacres took place at Srebrenica, so that after former Bosnian 
Serb army officers Momir Nikolic and Dragan Obrenovic pleaded guilty in May 2003 to help-
ing plan the Srebrenica massacre, one survivor described feeling a sense of relief that he had not 
known since the massacre took place.72 Admissions and apologies can advance reconciliation 
and should be commended and probably rewarded. But institutions like the IC1Y can im-
pair the very reconciliation that they seek to advance if the rewards that they hand out them-
selves become a new source of bitterness. 
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72 Emir Suljagic, Truth at The Hague, N.Y. TIMES, june I, 2003, §4, at 13. 
